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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tabitha Briana Martin appeals the district court’s order withholding judgment and
placing Martin on probation for five years, entered after a jury convicted Martin of felony
domestic violence in the presence of a child. On appeal, Martin argues that the district
court erred in overruling her relevancy objection to Martin’s daughter’s testimony on the
timing of a conversation she had with Martin about getting Martin treatment for drinking.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On September 29, 2016, Officer Adam Crist and Officer Andy Hilton were
dispatched to Martin’s residence in response to a 9-1-1 call received from Martin’s
husband, David Martin (“David”). (Tr., p.187, Ls.7-9; p.226, Ls.14-21; p.241, L.21 –
p.242, L.2. 1) Shortly after arriving, Officer Hilton spoke with David. (Tr., p.243, Ls.1213.) He could see injuries on David, including “two bumps on the side of his head; one
above his left eye, one kind of below it.” (Tr., p.244, Ls.7-23.) David showed him videos
from his cell phone “of what had transpired.” (Tr., p.244, Ls.4-6.) One of the videos
showed Martin hitting David in the head with a cupboard door. (See State’s Exhibit 4,
IMG_0683.MOV at 00:42 – 00:51.)
After speaking with David, Officer Hilton spoke with Martin. (Tr., p.245, Ls.1315.) He could “smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage” around her. (Tr., p.247, Ls.1119.) “She also was slurring her speech, her sentences were sometimes hard to follow or
incoherent or they’d go off track really quickly.” (Id.) Martin “really distanced herself
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All “Tr.” references are to the transcript of the trial held on April 10 and April 11, 2017,
unless otherwise indicated.
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from [David’s] injuries,” telling Officer Hilton that she “didn’t cause those” and “didn’t
have any idea how they had happened.” (Tr., p.249, Ls.5-9.) After Officer Hilton informed
Martin that he had seen a video of what happened, she said she “didn’t do it intentionally.”
(Tr., p.249, Ls.10-17; p.253, Ls.21-23.) Based on her statements, on her demeanor, and on
the physical evidence, Officer Hilton arrested Martin. (Tr., p.254, Ls.2-7.)
Because David and Martin’s 1-year-old child, C.M., was present at the time of the
incident, Martin was charged with felony domestic violence in the presence of a child. (See
R., pp.56-57.) Martin entered a not-guilty plea. (See R., p.61.) The case proceeded to
trial.
At trial, the state’s theory was that Martin had attacked David because Martin was
“[d]runk, angry, [and] irrational.” (Tr., p.102, Ls.16-21.) The state explained in its opening
statement, without objection, that “drinking had been a demon in [Martin’s] life for some
time” and that when Martin “would get intoxicated, she would become mean, irrational,
[and] loud.” (Tr., p.103, Ls.3-16.) On the day of the incident, according to the prosecutor,
when a drunk Martin discovered that David had given $8 to Martin’s adult daughter, Drissa
Kerbs, Martin “immediately lost it.” (Tr., p.104, Ls.1-8.) The state explained that the
ensuing altercation turned physical when Martin pushed David, grabbed his face, slammed
the cupboard door in his face, slammed the cupboard on his wrist, and clawed his face—
all while C.M. was present in the home. (Tr., p.105, L.17 – p.107, L.21.)
The defense’s theory was that the altercation was not based on $8 but was simply a
reflection that Martin’s marriage was coming to an end. (Tr., p.108, L.25 – p.109, L.2.)
The defense agreed that Martin had been drinking that day, “because this was supposed to
be their vacation,” but Martin firmly denied she was drunk. (Tr., p.110, Ls.11-19; p.287,
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Ls.3-5.) According to the defense, her anger was a result of Martin being hurt by David
not being “engaged or excited about the trip” they had planned and by David giving money
to Kerbs without first consulting with Martin. (Tr., p.110, Ls.11-19; p.111, L.1 – p.112,
L.3.) The defense told the jury that Martin did hit David in the face with the cupboard
door, but only after he opened the cupboard and, “out of reflex she bats it away because
it’s in her face.” (Tr., p.113, Ls.2-13; p.114, Ls.10-11.) Martin denied scratching David
“in the way that he is saying” and outright denied causing any of his other injuries. (Tr.,
p.291, L.19 – p.292, L.24.)
The state put on five witnesses for its case: Kerbs, David, Wendy Luderman
(David’s sister), Officer Crist, and Officer Hilton. Kerbs is Martin’s adult daughter and
David’s stepdaughter and lived with them at the time of the incident. (Tr., p.116, Ls.1520; p.117, Ls.2-12; p.123 L.20 – p.124, L.1.) She testified for the state under subpoena.
(Tr., p.116, Ls.21-23.) Without objection from the defense, Kerbs testified:
Q. Do you know if she [Martin] had started to drink again in the months
leading up to September the 29th?
A. I think it was within that month, I’m pretty sure before that it had been
three years since she had any alcohol.
Q. So she enjoyed a pretty significant period of sobriety?
A. Yes.
Q. And then within about a month are you saying that July and September
or just within September?
A. I believe it was only September, but I’m not really sure because I was
nowhere that she had been drinking the day of the incident until later I guess.
Q. Okay. So in that month when she had started drinking again, could you
tell a difference in her behavior versus the times that she was sober?
A. Yes, just because I know what she’s like when she is drunk. So it’s kind
of easy for me to tell.
Q. How is she like when she’s drunk?
A. She just seems easy to upset and just kind of irrational. And I just think,
yeah, that’s basically – I mean, she’s just kind of hard to talk to, she doesn’t
really – it’s difficult to get through to her if you’re trying to speak to her.
Q. When she’s under the influence?
A. Yes.
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...
Q. During this time that she was drinking in the times that she was sober
during that month, was she kind of more normal mom or was she still as
irrational?
A. Just normal. I think the drinking is the main contributor to that behavior.
Q. Had you had any conversations with her about how her behavior differed
when she we [sic] drinking versus when she was sober?
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. Did you ever talk to her about maybe getting treatment or classes or
rehabilitation?
A. I’m pretty sure I mentioned that at some point.
Q. Did she seem receptive to that to you, like she wanted to get help?
A. I don’t think she believed that she needed it.
(Tr., p.121, L.20 – p.122, L.21; p.122, L.25 – p.123, L.14.)
After the prosecutor asked some background questions about the day of the
incident, she circled back to the topic of Martin getting treatment and asked:
Q. When was it that you had the conversation with her about getting
treatment or help for her drinking?
A. I’m not really sure that it happened within this time, but I remember
there’s been issues in the past just she’s not –
(Tr., p.124, Ls.16-21.) At that point, Martin’s attorney objected because “it’s not relevant.”
(Tr., p.124, Ls.22-23.) The district court noted that “the whole issue’s been raised by both
sides during their opening statements” and told the prosecutor she could “go ahead a little
farther.” (Tr., p.125, Ls.6-9.) The prosecutor asked a follow-up question:
Q. (BY MS. BUTTRAM) So as I understand you were saying it was a
previous time that you had talked with her about getting some help?
A. Yes. She’s had issues in the past with drinking, and I believe it was then
that I had suggested that she address that issue.
(Tr., p.125, Ls.10-15.) The prosecutor then transitioned back to the day of the incident.
Kerbs testified that, when she arrived home, Martin and David “were packing to
leave to go on a trip for McCall.” (Tr., p.126, Ls.5-13.) She testified that, at some point,
David went to his car to get money “[b]ecause I didn’t have any money and there wasn’t
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really food at the house, so he wanted to help me out and make sure I had something while
they were gone.”

(Tr., p.127, Ls.2-8.)

After David gave her the money, Martin

“automatically got upset that he had done that.” (Tr., p.128, Ls.4-16.) Kerbs testified that
she believed “almost the entire reason” for Martin getting upset “was because she was
drunk and that she is irrational when she’s under the influence of alcohol,” (id.), and that
even though she had not seen Martin drinking that day, “it was pretty clear that she had
been” (Tr., p.129, Ls.2-6).
Kerbs explained that she used her cell phone to record Martin yelling “to send that
to my brother . . . because it felt it was ridiculous and frustrating because I thought it was
a pointless argument.” (Tr., p.129, Ls.7-21.) The state admitted the video into evidence
without objection. (Tr., p.132, Ls.2-4.) Throughout the video, an angry Martin can be
heard yelling at David that he is “a [expletive] pervert,” a “[expletive] disgusting slob,”
and “a [expletive] sleaze bag”—all because he gave Kerbs money without consulting
Martin. (See
- - State’s Exhibit 1.)
Kerbs testified that she left “almost immediately after” she took the video and was
not present to see any physical altercation between David and Martin. (Tr., p.132, Ls.1722.) When she returned to the house later that day, David “had a black eye.” (Tr., p.133,
Ls.1-5.)

Kerbs also testified that a couple weeks after the incident, Kerbs had a

conversation with Martin about the black eye. (Tr., p.133, Ls.10-16.) Kerbs confirmed
that Martin told her, in reference to David’s black eye: “That’s from me closing his cabinet
on his face.” (Tr., p.134, Ls.3-8.)
David testified that, on the day of the incident, Martin went to the store to purchase
alcohol and other supplies for their trip. (Tr., p.155, Ls.7-9; p.156, Ls.14-19.) Things
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“were fine” between David and Martin when she returned from the store, but Martin started
drinking shortly after she returned and “[s]he was noticeably starting to get inebriated.”
(Tr., p.156, Ls.1-9.) After Kerbs pointed out that David and Martin had taken all of the
food from the refrigerator for their trip, David “went straight out to the car in the garage,
got my wallet to get some cash for [Kerbs], which was only $8, and I went right back into
the kitchen and gave it to her.” (Tr., p.158, L.17 – p.159, L.5.) At that point, Martin
“started yelling and came out of the bathroom into the hallway.” (Tr., p.159, Ls.6-20.)
David tried “to calm [Martin] down” but “[s]he had been drinking more and more so she
got more aggressive and started yelling more.” (Tr., p.162, L.9 – p.163, L.4.)
David explained to the jury that Martin became physical when she “pushed me a
few times in the back” while he was holding C.M. (Tr., p.162, Ls.9-13; p.162, L.20 –
p.163, L.7.) He testified that, “pretty quickly” after that happened, while he was “putting
away peanut butter, I distinctly remember, and [Martin] was yelling at me, and she
slammed the cabinet door into – the corner of the cabinet door into my face.” (Tr., p.163,
Ls.8-24.) He also testified that Martin “slammed my arm in the cabinet like three times”
while he was “putting away some Tupperware up into the other cabinets,” and that “she
clawed at my face two different times.” (Tr., p.163, Ls.8-24.) According to David, “at
different times [C.M.] was in the den in [C.M.’s] play room, and [C.M.] was in the living
room for a little bit of time as well.” (Tr., p.165, Ls.10-16.)
The state introduced into evidence a series of videos that David took on his cell
phone. (Tr., p.166, L.22 – p.167, L.17.) In the videos, Martin can be seen and heard yelling
at David for giving money to Kerbs using language similar to the language used in the
video taken by Kerbs. (See
- - State’s Exhibit 4.) In one of the videos, David opens a cabinet
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door and puts an unidentifiable container inside the cabinet. (See State’s Exhibit 4,
IMG_0683.MOV at 00:42 – 00:45.) Martin is standing next to him but moves slightly
behind him and to the side before he opens the cabinet door. (See id.) After the cabinet
door has been opened, it is slammed closed on David’s head. (See id.) David immediately
reacts by saying, “Ow! [expletive]! You just [expletive] hit me in the head!” (Id. at 00:45
– 00:49.) Martin sarcastically responds, “Why are you poking your head out, Dave?” (Id.
at 00:49 – 00:51.) Shortly after, the marks left on David’s face from the cabinet can be
seen in the video. (See id. at 01:08 – 01:12.) The state also introduced photographs of
David’s injuries. (See State’s Exhibits 2, 5-6.)
David testified that he decided to call the police because he didn’t know “what is
going to be next.” (Tr., p.169, L.17 – p.170, L.1.) He also contacted his sister to ask that
she come help calm the situation down. 2 (Tr., p.176, Ls.8-22; p.184, Ls.13-16.) While
David was waiting for the police to arrive, Martin “came back down the hall.” (Tr., p.178,
Ls.4-18.) David “noticed she had a bump on her head.” (Id.) He asked what happened
and “she said something to the effect of, [w]e’ll see what they say now, or let’s see what
they think now, something like that.” (Id.)
Officer Crist testified that he could tell, based on his training and experience, that
Martin was under the influence of alcohol when he arrived at the scene. (Tr., p.229, L.25
– p.230, L.2.) Specifically, he “could smell it on her breath,” “[s]he had glassy, bloodshot
eyes,” and “[s]he had slurred speech as well when she spoke.” (Tr., p.230, Ls.3-9.) Martin
told Officer Crist that “she had had six Bud Lights.” (Tr., p.230, Ls.10-14.) Martin also

2

David’s sister testified that she went to David’s house after receiving his phone call, that
Martin was upset when she arrived, and that she tried to calm Martin down. (Tr., p.221,
Ls.18-20; p.222, L.16 – p.223, L.20).
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told Officer Crist that the bump on her head came from when “her husband had opened up
the door, the cabinet door and hit her in the head.” (Tr., p.232, Ls.9-16.) She also claimed
“she didn’t know how [David] got the injuries.” (Tr., p.232, Ls.17-23.)
Officer Hilton testified that he could tell Martin was intoxicated when he arrived at
the scene. (Tr., p.247, Ls.6-19.) With respect to David’s injuries, Martin initially told
Officer Hilton that “she didn’t cause those, didn’t have any idea how they had happened.”
(Tr., p.249, Ls.1-9.) But after Officer Hilton informed Martin that he had seen a video of
how the injury happened, Martin changed her answer and started saying, “‘If I did it, I
didn’t do it intentionally or I don’t remember doing it.’” (Tr., p.249, Ls.10-21.) After
Officer Hilton arrested Martin, she said “[h]e hurt me before that video was taken” and
“she was referring to the cell phone video.” (Tr., p.248, Ls.10-18.) The state introduced a
photograph of the bump on Martin’s head. (See
- - State’s Exhibit 14.)
Martin testified as the only witness for the defense. According to Martin, the
incident was “not about the $8” but was “the straw that broke the camel’s back” in their
relationship. (Tr., p.277, Ls.4-7.)

She agreed that she was angry in the videos and that

she was “terribly embarrassed” by her behavior, but explained to the jury that she acted
that way because she was “very hurt” and “knew that my marriage was pretty much over.”
(Tr., p.284, L.15 – p.285, L.19.)
Martin told the jury that, on the day of the incident, she started drinking when she
came home from the store, and that she drank a six pack of Bud Light. (Tr., p.283, Ls.717; p.283, L.22 – p.284, L.4.) But she denied she was drunk in the videos. (Tr., p.287,
Ls.3-5.) With respect to the cabinet hitting David’s head, she testified that “he’s opening
the cabinet, and all I see from the side is this cabinet coming, and out of reflex I just pushed
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it back.” (Tr., p.289, Ls.11-20.) She denied slamming his arm in the cabinet and denied
scratching his face “in the way that he is saying.” (Tr., p.291, Ls.19-23; p.292, Ls.19-24.)
Instead, her testimony was that she only pushed David when she was pushing back after
he hit her in the head with the cabinet. (Tr., p.292, L.25 – p.294, L.3.)
On cross examination, Martin admitted that when she was first asked by police how
David got his injuries, she said she did not know and mentioned that “he’s received injuries
from his employment from installing glass.” (Tr., p.314, Ls.16-24.) She agreed that she
told police she did not see him get hurt, (Tr., p.315, Ls.3-5), and that she told the officers,
“[n]o, I did not hit him with the cupboard door, I didn’t physically hit him with the
cupboard door.” (Tr., p.315, Ls.10-17.)
With respect to her own injury, Martin conceded that she had told Officer Crist that
she did not feel the injury to her head because she was “numb because [she] had been
drinking.” (Tr., p.311, L.24 – p.312, L.5.). She also confirmed that she told officers that
David hit her in the head with a cabinet while they “were still in the midst of packing and
putting things in bags.” (Tr., p.322, Ls.14-20.) She also testified that, prior to the cell
phone videos, David had been antagonizing her by repeatedly opening cabinet drawers and
that she had told either Officer Crist or Officer Hilton that David had been antagonizing
her when they arrived at her home. (Tr., p.305, L.9 – p.307, L.6.)
The state’s rebuttal case consisted solely of re-calling Officers Crist and Hilton.
The officers testified that Martin never told them that David had been pushing her buttons
or instigating the incident by opening drawers and cabinets. (Tr., p.328, Ls.14-23; p.329,
L.16 – p.330, L.4.)
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The jury convicted Martin of felony domestic violence in the presence of a child.
(See
- - Tr., p.388, L.21 – p.390, L.13.) The district court withheld judgment and placed
Martin on probation for five years. (R., 157-63.) Martin timely appealed. (R., 165-69.)
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ISSUE
Martin states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it allowed Ms. Kerbs to testify about the
timing of her conversation, prior to the incident, with Ms. Martin on getting
treatment for Ms. Martin’s drinking, because the testimony was not
relevant?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court err when it overruled Martin’s relevancy objection to Kerbs’s
testimony on the timing of a conversation she had with Martin about Martin’s drinking
where the jury had already heard, without objection, the substance of the conversation?

11

ARGUMENT
Martin Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It
Overruled Her Relevancy Objection
A.

Introduction
The district court properly admitted Kerbs’s testimony on the timing of the

conversation she had with Martin regarding Martin’s drinking. The state’s theory at trial
was that Martin attacked David because she was drunk, irrational, and angry. The state
used the timing of the conversation, along with the conversation itself, to show the jury
that Kerbs was familiar with Martin’s drinking in order to corroborate Kerbs’s testimony
that she could infer Martin was drunk on the day of the incident. That is sufficient to make
the testimony relevant.
Moreover, any error in the admission of the testimony at issue is harmless for a
number of reasons. First, there was nothing prejudicial about revealing the mere timing of
Kerbs’s conversation with Martin, especially because the jury already knew that Kerbs and
Martin had the conversation and that it was about Martin getting treatment for her drinking.
Second, any prejudice to Martin from Kerbs’s testimony was sufficiently limited by the
district court’s instruction to the jury on the proper use of evidence. Third, the evidence
presented against Martin at trial was overwhelming, including a video of her slamming the
cupboard door into David’s head.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether “evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free review.”

State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907, 354 P.3d 462, 469 (2014). If this Court determines
that objected-to evidence was erroneously admitted, “the next issue is whether the error
was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010). A
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harmless error “does not require reversal or a new trial.” State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139,
146, 176 P.3d 911, 918 (2007).
C.

Kerbs’s Testimony On The Timing Of Her Conversation With Martin Was
Relevant
The district court properly found that Kerbs’s testimony was relevant. 3 “To be

admissible, evidence must be relevant.” State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 100, 334 P.3d 280,
291 (2014) (citing I.R.E. 401, 402). “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” Id. (quoting I.R.E. 401).
“Whether a fact is material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented
by the parties.” Koch, 157 Idaho at 100-01, 334 P.3d at 291-92 (citing State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008)).
Evidence may be relevant if it supports a witness’s credibility by corroborating his
or her testimony. See Johnson, 148 Idaho at 671, 227 P.3d at 925 (holding “statements
were admissible to corroborate Mrs. Johnson’s credibility” because they were “relevant to
help the jury understand why Mrs. Johnson acted the way she did”); White v. Mock, 140
Idaho 882, 891, 104 P.3d 356, 365 (2004) (holding photographs relevant because “they

3

After Kerbs finished testifying, Martin moved for a mistrial arguing, among other things,
that Kerbs’s testimony about alcohol rehab and past drinking were inadmissible under
I.R.E. 404(b). (Tr., p.141, L.23 – p.142, L.23.) The district court initially took the motion
under advisement and then found at a hearing after trial that “there was no error for legal
defect in the proceedings, under Rule 404(b)” and that, “assuming for the sake of argument
that there was such error, the error, if it existed, was harmless.” (Tr., p.144, Ls.15-21;
4/26/2017 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-13.) Martin has not argued on appeal that the district court erred
in this decision. Martin did not cite Rule 404(b) in her opening brief, much less argue that
the admission of the testimony at issue violated Rule 404(b). Accordingly, Martin has
waived any argument on appeal that Kerbs’s testimony violated Rule 404(b). See State v.
Baxter, No. 45343, Slip Op. at 7 n.3, 9 n.6 (S. Ct. Jan. 5, 2018) (citing Liponis v. Bach,
149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010)).
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corroborated White’s original observations”); State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 524, 547 P.2d
1128, 1129 (1976) (“At the least, the test results are relevant to corroborate witnesses’
testimony of observed physical manifestations of intoxication.”); State v. Fee, 124 Idaho
170, 177, 857 P.2d 649, 656 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding “evidence was clearly relevant”
because it “served to corroborate the victim’s version of the incident in her house”).
Kerbs’s testimony regarding the timing of her conversation with Martin about alcohol
treatment was relevant because it corroborated her testimony and supported the state’s
theory of the case.
The state’s theory at trial was that Martin was drunk on the day of the incident,
which caused her to act irrationally, overreact to David giving Kerbs money, and attack
David. (Tr., p.102, L.16 – p.108, L.5; p.334, L.18 – p.335, L.4.) The state used Kerbs’s
testimony to help prove Martin was drunk on the day of the incident. Kerbs did not see
Martin drinking that day. (Tr., p.139, Ls.12-13.) Instead, Kerbs inferred that Martin “was
drunk” based on the way Martin was acting. (See Tr., p.128, Ls.4-16; p.129, Ls.2-6.) In
order to show the jury that Kerbs had adequate knowledge to make that inference, the
prosecutor elicited from Kerbs—without objection—that she “know[s] what [Martin’s]
like when she is drunk” and that “it’s kind of easy for [Kerbs] to tell.” (Tr., p.122, Ls.813.) Kerbs testified that when Martin is drunk “[s]he just seems easy to upset and just kind
of irrational,” that “she’s just kind of hard to talk to,” and “it’s difficult to get through to
her.” (Tr., p.122, Ls.14-21.)
The state corroborated Kerbs’s testimony that she could infer Martin was drunk by
showing that Kerbs was familiar with Martin’s drinking. Specifically, Kerbs testified—
without objection—that she “mentioned at some point” to Martin that she should “get[]
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treatment or classes or rehabilitation” for her drinking. (Tr., p.123, Ls.9-11.) And, over
defense counsel’s objection, she testified that the conversation occurred when Martin “had
issues in the past with drinking.” (Tr., p.124, L.16 – p.125, L.15.) The fact that Kerbs
suggested to Martin that she should get help with her drinking—and did so prior to the day
of the incident—was relevant because it showed the jury that Kerbs was familiar with
Martin’s drinking prior to the day of the incident, and thus corroborated Kerbs’s testimony
that, on the day of the incident, she could infer that Martin was drunk.
Martin erroneously argues that the testimony at issue is not relevant because it “did
not make it more or less likely that any or all of the elements of the instant offense . . .
occurred.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Relevance is not determined strictly by the elements
of a crime. See, e.g., Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 446, 180 P.3d at 485 (holding warrants were
admissible even though they “were not relevant to the possession of methamphetamine
charge itself” because they “explain the police officers’ actions”). The question is whether
the evidence is relevant to a material fact, and “‘[w]hether a fact is material is determined
by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.’” Johnson, 148 Idaho at
671, 227 P.3d at 925 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221
(2010)). The testimony at issue is relevant because it supports the state’s theory that Martin
attacked David because she was drunk, acting irrationally, and overreacting to David
giving Kerbs $8.
Martin also argues that the testimony at issue could not be relevant to Kerbs’s
credibility because her character for truthfulness had not been attacked. (See Appellant’s
brief, p.9 (citing I.R.E. 608(a)).) But the state did not introduce the testimony at issue to
show—and it does not show—that Kerbs has a truthful character, which is the kind of
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evidence contemplated by I.R.E. 608. The state introduced it to corroborate a specific
aspect of Kerbs’s testimony and help the jury understand that Kerbs knew what she
claimed—namely, that at the time the incident occurred, she was able to infer that Martin
was drunk. (See Tr., p.124, L.25 – p.125, L.5.) That is sufficient to make the testimony
relevant.
D.

Any Error In Admitting The Testimony Was Harmless
Even if the district court erred in admitting Kerbs’s testimony regarding the timing

of her conversation with Martin, that error was harmless. “To establish harmless error, the
State must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 814 (2014)
(quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)). “‘In other words,
the error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.’”
State v. Montgomery, ___ Idaho ___, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (quoting State v. Almaraz,
154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)). The result here would have been the same
without the alleged error because (1) the specific testimony at issue had no prejudicial
effect, (2) the district court gave an instruction to the jury that sufficiently limited any
prejudice, and (3) the evidence presented against Martin at trial was overwhelming.
First, any error in admitting the testimony at issue here was harmless because the
testimony “had no prejudicial content.” State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 27, 205 P.3d 671,
676 (Ct. App. 2009); see State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 136, 294 P.3d 1137, 1148 (Ct.
App. 2013) (“In reviewing for harmless error, the court evaluates the potential prejudice
from the inadmissible evidence in the context of the evidence presented at trial.”). The
objected-to testimony only revealed to the jury the timing of the conversation between
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Kerbs and Martin. (Tr., p.124, L.16 – p.125, L.15.) The jury already knew that the
conversation occurred as well as the content of the conversation, because Kerbs had already
testified, without any objection from Martin, that she had spoken with Martin about
“getting treatment or classes or rehabilitation” for her drinking. (Tr., p.123, Ls.9-11.) The
admission of the testimony was thus harmless because there is nothing prejudicial about
the mere timing of the conversation between Kerbs and Martin.
Second, “the jury instruction in this case sufficiently limited any prejudicial effect.”
Parker, 157 Idaho at 141, 334 P.3d at 815. “‘Error in admission of evidence may be cured
by proper instruction, and it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s
direction.’” Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 699, 378 P.3d 464, 489 (2016) (quoting Cook
v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 32, 13 P.3d 857, 863 (2000)). While Kerbs was still on the
stand, the district court decided to give the jury “an instruction on other acts” because “we
are getting into or we have been getting into matters that are outside what happened on this
particular day.” (Tr., p.130, Ls.11-15.) The district court instructed the jury:
There is evidence that has been presented that may suggest that the
defendant committed acts other than that for which she’s on trial. The
evidence, if believed, is not intended to show that the defendant is a person
of bad character but only to show the circumstances immediately
surrounding the events in question and to show any knowledge on the part
of the defendant. The evidence must not be considered for any other
purpose.
(Tr., p.131, Ls.11-15 (paragraph breaks omitted).) To the extent the testimony at issue
“may suggest that the defendant committed acts other than that for which she’s on trial,”
the district court’s instruction properly limited the jury’s use of that testimony. (Id.)
Consequently, any prejudice to Martin from the admission of that testimony was
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sufficiently limited to make any error in its admission harmless. See Parker, 157 Idaho at
141, 334 P.3d at 815.
Third, the purported error was also harmless because the evidence presented against
Martin at trial was overwhelming. See Montgomery, 408 P.3d at 44 (holding error
harmless “[b]ased on the overwhelming evidence presented against Montgomery at trial”).
David testified that Martin, while under the influence of alcohol, overreacted when he gave
$8 to Kerbs and physically assaulted him in the presence of their child. (Tr., p.156, Ls.49; p.159, Ls.6-23; p.162, Ls.9-13; p.163, Ls.5-24; p.165, Ls.10-24.) His testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of the other witnesses, the physical evidence, and the videos
recorded at the time of the incident.
Kerbs, Officer Crist, and Officer Hilton all testified that Martin was drunk or under
the influence of alcohol that day. (Tr., p.128, Ls.4-16; p.229, L.25 – p.230, L.9; p.247,
Ls.6-19.) Kerbs testified that Martin “automatically got upset” when David gave Kerbs
the $8. (Tr., p.128, Ls.4-16.) In the video Kerbs recorded, an obviously upset Martin can
be heard yelling at David that he is “a [expletive] pervert,” a “[expletive] disgusting slob,”
and “a [expletive] sleaze bag” because he gave Kerbs money without consulting Martin.
(See State’s Exhibit 1.) The videos recorded by David also show an explosive Martin
yelling and cursing at David because he gave Kerbs money. (See State’s Exhibit 4.)
Martin’s criminal act of slamming David’s head with a cupboard door was recorded
on video and played to the jury. (See State’s Exhibit 4, IMG_0683.MOV at 00:42 – 00:51.)
According to Martin’s own daughter, Martin confessed a couple weeks after the incident
that David’s black eye was “from me closing his cabinet on his face.” (Tr., p.133, L.6 –
p.134, L.8.) David’s injury from the attack can be seen on the video and in multiple
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photographs admitted as evidence. (See id. at 01:08 – 01:12; State’s Exhibits 2, 5-8.)
Testimony from Kerbs and Officer Hilton also corroborated the injury. (See Tr., p.133,
Ls.3-5; p.244, Ls.16-23.) 4
Martin presented her own version of events at trial, but it was riddled with
significant inconsistencies—both internally and with the other evidence. She denied that
she was drunk in the videos (Tr., p.287, Ls.3-5), but confessed that she told Officer Crist
when he arrived that she was numb from drinking (Tr., p.311, L.24 – p.312, L.5), and
confirmed that “toward the end of the afternoon” she was “no longer capable of caring for
[C.M.] in [her] intoxicated state” (Tr., p.323, L.25 – p.324, L.4). She claimed that she told
either Officer Crist or Officer Hilton that David instigated the altercation by pulling out
drawers (Tr., p.305, L.9 – p.307, L.6), but both officers denied she ever said that (Tr.,
p.328, Ls.14-23; p.329, L.16 – p.330, L.4).
She testified on direct that she hit David with the cupboard door but that it was an
unintentional reflex. (Tr., p.289, L.8 – p.290, L.7). She then conceded on cross that when
she first spoke with the officers she said she did not know how David was injured, she said

4

In order to convict Martin, the state had to prove that, at the time of the domestic violence,
“a child under the age of sixteen is present and may see or hear an act of domestic battery.”
(R., pp.121-22, 125.) All of the evidence related to C.M. supports the jury’s finding that
C.M. was “present.” Kerbs testified that C.M. was in the house when she first arrived that
day. (Tr., p.125, Ls.20-23.) Martin testified that, for at least part of the time, C.M. was in
the living room watching TV. (Tr., p.294, Ls.10-20.) David testified that he was holding
C.M. for part of the time and “at different times [C.M.] was in the den in his play room,
and he was in the living room for a little bit of time as well.” (Tr., p.163, Ls.5-7; p.165,
Ls.10-16.) C.M. can also be seen near David and Martin at various points throughout the
video. (See, e.g., State’s Exhibit 4, IMG_0685.MOV at 00:28 – 00:34, 01:02 – 01:15.)
Not only does that constitute overwhelming evidence of the “present” element of the crime,
but the evidence that Martin claims was erroneously admitted has nothing to do with
whether or not C.M. was present. In other words, the error was certainly harmless with
respect to the jury’s finding that C.M. was present, because the jury would have reached
the same result on that issue absent the alleged error. See Montgomery, 408 P.3d at 44.
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she did not hit David with the cabinet, and she implied that it happened at his work. (Tr.,
p.314, L.16 – p.315, L.17.) In addition to each of Martin’s stories contradicting the other,
neither story can be squared with the video of the attack, which shows Martin hit David in
the head with the cupboard door and then sarcastically ask him “why are you poking your
head out, Dave?” (See State’s Exhibit 4, IMG_0683.MOV at 00:42 – 00:51.)
Martin also testified that, on the day of the incident, she told the officers that David
caused the bump on her head “in the midst of packing and putting things in bags,” which
would be before the videos were taken. (Tr., p.322, Ls.14-23.) This is consistent with
Officer Hilton’s testimony that, after he placed Martin under arrest, she said that David
“hurt me before that video was taken.” (Tr., p.248, Ls.10-18.) But both of these statements
to the officers, made by Martin on the day of the incident, are inconsistent with the video
evidence, which shows no injuries on Martin’s head at the time the videos were taken, (see,
e.g., State’s Exhibit 4, IMG_0683.MOV at 00:07 – 00:10; IMG_0685.MOV at 02:32 –
02:39; IMG_0682.MOV at 00:00 – 00:02, 00:47), even though the injury Martin ultimately
sustained to her head was significant (see State’s Exhibit 14). 5 The video is consistent,
however, with David’s testimony that Martin inflicted the injury on herself shortly before
the police arrived and then told David “[w]e’ll see what they say now.” (Tr., p.178, Ls.418.)
Given the numerous inconsistencies in Martin’s version of the events and the
overwhelming evidence of Martin’s guilt, including video evidence of the crime, any error
in admitting Kerbs’s testimony on the timing of her conversation with Martin was

5

In an attempt to rehabilitate her testimony, Martin testified on redirect that the timing she
gave the officers on the day of the incident was not accurate and that David had actually
injured her ten minutes before the police arrived. (See Tr., p.325, Ls.5-24.)
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harmless. See Montgomery, 408 P.3d at 44 (holding error harmless where the jury
“watched a video of the events which showed the incident as it unfolded”). This conclusion
is supported by the district court’s ruling on Martin’s motion for a mistrial, in which she
argued that the district court should not have admitted any of the testimony related to
“alcohol use” and “attending rehab for alcohol use.” (4/26/2017 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-21.) The
district court, who heard all of the evidence presented to the jury, found “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission
of the challenged evidence.” (4/26/2017 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-13.) It necessarily follows that the
jury would have reached the same conclusion without the evidence Martin challenges on
appeal, which is limited to a narrower subset of the evidence challenged in the motion for
a mistrial—namely, the timing of the conversation about attending rehab for alcohol use.
(See Appellant’s brief, p.1.) Any error in the admission of the challenged evidence was
thus harmless. See Montgomery, 408 P.3d at 44.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s Order
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered upon a jury’s guilty verdict against
Martin for felony domestic violence in the presence of a child.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye__________________
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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